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The organized hypocrisy of ethical foreign policy: Human rights, democracy and 
Western arms sales 
 
Abstract 
 
Over the past two decades, Western political leaders have scripted a more ethical foreign 
policy, wherein far greater weight is given to protecting the rights and freedoms of extra-
territorial citizens. Using the example of arms exports to developing countries, the 
present paper exposes the organized hypocrisy underlying countries’ self-declared ethical 
turn. We show that the major Western arms supplying states – France, Germany, the UK 
and the US – have generally not exercised export controls so as to discriminate against 
human rights abusing or autocratic countries during the post-Cold War period. Rather, we 
uncover ongoing territorial egoism, in that arms have been exported to countries which 
serve supplying states’ domestic economic and security interests.  
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Introduction 
 
A defining feature of geopolitics over the past two decades has been the extent to which 
Western political leaders have placed ethical and moral considerations at the heart of 
their foreign policy discourse (Chandler 2003; Dodds 2005; Slater and Bell 2002). In 
practice, this has meant different things in different countries, and the centrality ascribed 
to ethical concerns has waxed and waned across and within political administrations. Yet 
it has invariably included a heightened commitment to promote human rights and, to a 
greater or lesser extent, discursive endorsement for the principle of protecting or 
advancing democracy in extra-territorial spaces (Gaskarth 2006; Manzo 2003; Perkins 
and Neumayer 2008; Webber 2001).  
For geographers, Western powers’ self-declared ethical foreign policy is of 
particular interest. Assertions about the need to consider the rights, freedoms and well-
being of distant strangers script a geographic imaginary of a universal moral space where 
everyone, everywhere is governed by the same moral rules, and a stretching of state 
responsibility to protect beyond the national territory (Dodds 2005; Flint and Falah 
2004). Public declarations by Western elites to pursue a value-based foreign policy signal 
a more cosmopolitan, post-sovereign geopolitical order whereby international politics is 
increasingly guided by shared principles and norms, and state power is deployed in order 
to tackle non-territorial challenges of global justice (Beck 2006; Behr 2008; Rosenau 
1990). Accompanying these discursive scripts has been a reworking of notions of the 
national interest. Acting to protect extra-territorial citizens is not only the “right thing” to 
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do, but according to recent public statements, also the “self-interested” one (Cook 2002; 
Hancock 2007; Sparke 2007). 
A central question is whether this scalar construction of state morality, 
responsibility and geopolitical interests – laced with utopian visions of a world society 
built upon universal values, shared rules and mutual gains – amounts to anything more 
than empty rhetoric. Certainly, liberal visions of an ethically-motivated, post-sovereign 
state identity sit rather uncomfortably with (neo-)realist accounts, which portray states as 
selfish actors, primarily concerned with the defence of national interests of economy and 
security. One area where these disparate models of state action are likely to come to the 
fore is arms transfers. As part of their ethical commitments, many Western governments 
have pledged to consider human rights and (to a lesser extent) democratic conditions in 
deciding whether to sanction weapons exports from their territories. Yet implementing 
these obligations to protect universal rights at the international level might plausibly 
conflict with self-help, materialist national interests of economy and security. Have states 
reformed and rescaled their national interests and normative concerns such that they are 
willing to privilege the interests of distant strangers over conventional commercial and 
security imperatives? 
In order to address this question, we examine whether the West’s four major arms 
exporting countries – France, Germany, the UK and the US – have discriminated against 
human rights abusing and autocratic states, in the sense of (a) refusing to export weapons 
altogether or (b) restricting the amount of exports such that they receive a lower relative 
share of their overall weapons transfers. Building on theories of organized hypocrisy, we 
suggest that they are unlikely to have done so, with actual arms control practices 
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decoupled from ethical commitments (Brunsson 1989; Krasner 1999). Supporting our 
argument, we find very little evidence that Western countries have systematically 
discriminated against states with poor levels of human rights or democratic freedoms. 
Rather, we uncover ongoing territorial egoism, in that arms have been exported to 
countries which serve supplying states’ domestic economic and security interests.  
 
Organized Hypocrisy 
 
Our central argument in the present paper is that Western countries’ value-based arms 
control policy and practice is best understood in terms of organized hypocrisy – that is, 
inconsistent talk and action, arising from contradictory interests, obligations and 
incentives (Brunsson 1989; Krasner 1999; Lipson 2007). Although the concept can be 
traced to sociological notions of “decoupling” (Meyer and Rowan 1977), it is Krasner’s 
(1999) conceptualisation of organized hypocrisy that is most instructive in relation to 
questions about foreign policy. After March and Olson (1979), Krasner identifies two 
logics which govern actors’ behaviour: logics of consequences, which conceives 
‘political action and outcomes, including institutions, as the product of rational 
calculating behaviour designed to maximise a given set of unexplained preferences’ (i.e. 
instrumental, materialist), and logics of appropriateness, which ‘understand political 
action as a product of rules, roles and identities’ (i.e. normative, ideational) (Krasner 
2001, p.175-176). For Krasner, logics of consequences frequently take precedence over 
logics of appropriateness in world politics, giving rise to organized hypocrisy. Countries’ 
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rulers ‘rhetorically embrace’ international norms, rules and roles, but responding to 
domestic materialist imperatives, act in ways that contradict normative commitments.   
Underlying organized hypocrisy, Krasner argues, is a number of features of the 
international system. Most fundamentally, perhaps, is its anarchical nature. Inter-state 
competition for wealth, power and influence means that the compulsion for domestic 
governments to defer to domestic consequential logics is strong. Conversely, norms at the 
international level are characteristically weakly institutionalised, often ambiguous and 
vulnerable to defiance by powerful states.  
Not all scholars subscribe to the view that logics of consequences, on the one 
hand, and logics of appropriateness, on the other, can be treated as two entirely separate 
causal systems (Fearon and Wendt 2002; March and Olsen 1998). According to one line 
of argument, therefore, many actions equated with materialist motives involve a 
normative dimension. Hence, defending the economic or security interests of a 
territorially-bounded electorate may be the self-interested course of action, but it can also 
be interpreted as part-and-parcel of domestic politicians’ normative obligations. Another 
related line of argument maintains that normative concerns are themselves constitutive of 
interests and that norm compliance may be governed by calculative expectations of 
consequences. 
We are partly sympathetic to these arguments and, in line with several recent 
contributions, would submit that materialist interests and moral obligations are ‘not 
mutually exclusive and are interconnected in several ways’ (Herrmann and Shannon 
2001, pg.622). Hence particular choices, actions and representations may be guided by 
both sets of logics (March and Olsen 1998). We nevertheless believe that logics of 
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consequences and appropriateness remain useful analytic concepts, especially in 
situations involving trade-offs between domestic economic and security interests, on the 
one hand, and non-territorial normative obligations which prescribe right and wrong, on 
the other.  
 
Arming the Third World 
 
Arms transfers are another area where states might be expected to encounter competing 
interests, obligations and incentives. Arms are big business. As an indication: the total 
value of the global arms trade over the period 1992-2004 is estimated at roughly US$269 
billion (1990 prices), of which roughly US$185 billion comprised sales to developing 
countries (SIPRI 2007). According to nearly all measures, the US is by far the largest 
supplier of arms to developing countries, accounting for close to 40% of transfers 
between 1992-2004. The other “big” four are Russia, France, Germany and the UK. The 
latter three countries were together responsible for almost 20% of arms transfers over the 
same period, while Russia accounted for approximately 30.5%.  
Although a handful of countries dominate the transfer statistics, globalization of 
the defence industry over recent decades means that a growing share of the components, 
sub-modules and modules that go into making many weapons systems are manufactured 
in a number of different economies (Garcia-Alonso and Levine 2007; Lovering 1994). 
Still, control, co-ordination and final assembly activities continue to be managed largely 
by firms headquartered in the traditional arms supplying countries, such that government 
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export controls in these territories exert a potentially decisive influence over the 
destination of finished weapons.1 
There is nothing especially new in Western arms control. According to Krause 
and Latham (1998), the concept has its roots in the early Cold War period, underpinned 
by strategic motives to reduce the risks of an escalating East-West conflict. Later on, 
during the 1970s and 1980s, humanitarian principles began to assume a growing role in 
Western arms policy (Cooper 2000). As an example, President Carter introduced a new 
set of US export guidelines in 1997, which included a clause to “promote and advance 
respect for human rights in recipient countries” (Klare 1998, pg.86).  
Still, humanitarian concerns occupied a comparatively marginal position prior to 
the 1990s, with restrictions garnering only limited political traction in practice (Krause 
and Latham 1998). With the end of the Cold War, however, Western governments have 
sought to reinvigorate their support for a more ethically-grounded arms control regime. 
Indeed, consistent with their rearticulated rhetorical support, Western arms exporting 
countries have adopted new or revised arms control policies prohibiting or discouraging 
arms exports to regimes which infringe particular principles, particularly on human 
rights. In the US, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 34 issued in 1995 affirmed the 
country’s moral commitments by stating that, “The United States will act unilaterally to 
restrain the flow of arms…where the transfer of weapons raises issues involving human 
rights” (The White House 1995). The UK government also adopted revised criteria for 
                                                 
1
 All cross-border arms transfers – together with dual-use components which could potentially be 
used to manufacture weapons – from Western arms exporting countries require government 
export licences. 
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arms export licenses in the 1990s, with Britain’s foreign secretary boldly announcing, 
“Labour will not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal 
repression or international aggression” (Cook 1997). France and Germany have similarly 
incorporated policy principles which call for an evaluation of human rights conditions in 
recipient countries in deciding whether to sanction exports (Yanik 2006).  
Accompanying these domestic initiatives during the post-Cold War period have 
been a set of new multilateral agreements and codes governing arms transfers. The first 
of these, the European Council’s Declaration on Non-Proliferation and Arms Exports, 
was issued in 1991. It was soon followed by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Criteria on Conventional Arms Transfers (1993) and the 
European Union’s (EU) Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998)2. Common to the 
above are a set of principles which participants are expected to take into account when 
sanctioning arms exports. Amongst others, all three agreements/codes mention respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, consideration of the internal situation (i.e. 
existing tension and armed conflict) and the legitimate defence and security needs of the 
recipient. Although none of the existing multilateral agreements are legally binding, they 
nevertheless provide a set of common guidelines, and confer clear responsibilities on 
participants. 
 
The Paradox of Ethical Commitments 
 
                                                 
2
 France, Germany and the UK have been party to all three codes, whereas the US was a signatory 
to OSCE agreement. 
 10 
Western countries’ value-based arms control initiatives would appear to script a 
geopolitics of hope (Sparke 2007) – a more cosmopolitan geopolitical order in which 
sovereign states act in the defence of non-territorial principles. Together with more 
general public statements about ethics in foreign policy, such initiatives can be seen as a 
product of emerging norms of human rights and democracy at the international level, 
which have ascribed new rules, roles and obligations to sovereign states (Dodds 2005, 
Schmitz 2004; Solomon 2006). Amongst others, these norms script states’ rulers as 
guardians of extra-territorial human rights and democratic freedoms, and create duties 
and expectations for these actors to act in ways consistent with safeguarding or 
promoting liberal democratic principles beyond national borders. 
Yet acting according to these logics of appropriateness – by limiting arms exports 
to human rights abusing and/or autocratic regimes – might well clash with consequential 
logics in two possible ways. First, it is likely to be inconsistent with the commercial 
interests of defence firms located in the national territory, as well as individuals 
employed by these companies. Although analysts have questioned the net benefits 
derived by national economies from arms exports (Chalmers et al 2001; Dunne and 
Freeman 2003; Hartung 1999), weapons manufacture may nevertheless be a significant 
employer in certain regions, and a symbolically important source of export revenue. 
Indeed, perceptions matter, and vested interests have been instrumental in sustaining the 
image that arms exports are central to ongoing national prosperity. By undermining the 
economic fortunes of domestic arms vendors, as well as the job security of workers 
employed in these firms, enforcing ethically-motivated restrictions will inevitably run 
counter to powerful vested interests. Included here are the interests of political 
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representatives in jurisdictions where defence firms have a significant presence or who 
receive support from arms manufacturers. 
Another way in which logics might clash is rooted in geopolitics. Arms play a 
(potentially) important role in maintaining alliances, with Western countries historically 
restricting sales to unfriendly states, and preferentially supplying friendly, client or 
geostrategically important regimes (Agnew and Corbridge 1995; Sislin 1994).3 As 
stressed by classical and neo-realists, military (and to a lesser extent) other alliances are 
important for states’ domestic security, and therefore a central aspect of countries’ 
national self-interests that are extra-territorial in nature (Flint and Falah 2004; Ó Tuathail 
1992). The imperatives of military security, on the one hand, and compliance with norms 
governing the defence of human rights and democratic freedoms, on the other, may 
collide where allies are characterised by human rights abuses or limited democratic 
freedoms.  
We believe that political leaders are likely to have “managed” these conflicting 
pressures, forces and logics by resorting to organized hypocrisy. Territory and the 
correlative activity of defending the state space – together with promoting the interests of 
its bounded community – remain at the heart of the current geopolitical order (Dodds 
2005). Although this system is far from a straightforward struggle of “all against all”, 
growing global competition between arms manufacturers and ongoing (real, perceived or 
constructed) security threats to the national territory, mean that the incentive to defer to 
consequential, materialist interests in the case of arms is likely to remain strong. Indeed, 
                                                 
3
 Note, the supply of weapons to certain states is known to have had some unintended 
consequences, such as heightened terrorism against the supplying state’s own citizens (Neumayer 
and Plümper 2009). 
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to the extent that Western political rulers depend on the support of a territorially-bounded 
electorate whose interests in domestic economy frequently take precedence over other 
considerations, we expect domestic politicians to privilege commercial concerns 
(Abrahamsen and Williams 2001; Flint 2004). Going further, it could be argued that 
normative obligations felt by domestic political leaders to defend the economic and 
security interests of their own citizens may trump normative rules prescribing the defence 
of extra-territorial others. 
There will likely be exceptions: where human rights abuses in potential recipient 
states are especially acute, or where leaders show blatant disregard for democratic 
principles, state rulers may respond to normative obligations regarding humanitarianism 
and democratic freedoms by enforcing export restrictions. International outrage, 
increased domestic pressure and heightened concerns about reputation might transform 
the protection of extra-territorial individuals’ rights from a matter of largely normative 
action (i.e. “what is the appropriate thing for me to do”), to one that incorporates a greater 
element of self-interested, materialist concerns (i.e. “what is in my self-interests?”). Yet 
we believe that such instances are likely to be rare. For the most part, governments will 
seek to meet normative expectations to protect distant strangers through symbolic 
politics, i.e. talking about their values, making public pledges to consider human rights 
and democratic conditions, and endorsing non-binding principles. Actual behaviour is 
likely to be largely decoupled from these commitments. Accordingly, we expect Western 
powers will generally be no more likely to transfer weapons to Third World countries 
with good human rights and democratic records as bad ones, nor discriminate in terms of 
the volume of sales. 
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Instead, to the extent that states privilege or discriminate in sanctioning their arms 
exports, we expect four relational/extra-territorial factors which contribute to serving the 
national interest to be important. The first is geopolitical ties, including military alliances, 
but also colonial linkages. On the supply-side, these boundary-spanning relationships are 
likely to increase the willingness of arms exporters to supply weapons, and possibly 
supply them at reduced or zero prices. Likewise, on the demand-side, importing countries 
might be more willing to purchase weapons from their allies and/or former colonial 
masters, with whom they often (but not always, in the latter case) share friendly or 
cooperative relations. 
Another geopolitical factor is domestic security. Arms transfers potentially give 
rise to a negative security externality on the exporting country, with the risk that one’s 
arms exports are ever used to threaten one’s own security greater for countries which are 
geographically proximate (Garcia-Alonso and Levine 2007). We therefore logically 
expect that, with the exception of participants involved in regional security-cum-defence 
communities, countries to be more reluctant to sell weapons to geographically proximate 
countries. A third relational correlate is economic. Owing to their role in supporting the 
domestic prosperity of its citizens, and the importance of maintaining good diplomatic 
relations, we suspect that more economically significant trading partners stand a greater 
chance of being granted weapons. Fourth, and along similar lines, it follows that 
countries might be more inclined to purchase arms from states which import a larger 
share of their domestic goods and services (Hyde-Price 2000). 
 
Cross-country Variations 
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An important question is whether we should expect differences between individual 
Western states. While relatively little comparative work has been undertaken in this field, 
the literature nevertheless points to two factors which might influence the extent to which 
states are willing to sacrifice domestic economy and security concerns in the name of 
promoting human rights or democratic freedoms in extra-territorial spaces. One is power. 
According to Krasner (2001, p.176), “stronger states can pick and choose from amongst 
those norms that best suit their material interests, or ignore norms altogether”. Similar 
observations have been made in relation to the ability of the world’s hegemon (i.e. the 
US) to resist external normative pressure or to impose its own rules (Flint 2004). Applied 
to the present case, it could well be that more powerful states are better-placed to 
privilege their domestic economic and security interests by exporting weapons to regimes 
with poor records of human rights and democratic freedoms, and therefore engage in 
organized hypocrisy.  
A second factor is domestic institutions. According to an influential body of 
(new) institutionalist work in political science, countries are characterised by nationally-
idiosyncratic institutional traditions, which directly or indirectly shape policy choices 
(North 1980). Amongst these institutional factors, countries might plausibly differ in the 
extent to which norms of defending human rights and democratic freedoms in foreign 
spaces are domestically institutionalised, and therefore the degree to which they enter 
logics of governments’ action.  
At the broadest level, scholars have drawn from elements of the above to strike a 
contrast between the foreign policy of the EU and the US. Hence, founded on universal 
 15 
normative principles such as peace, consolidation of democracy and fundamental human 
freedoms, it is suggested that the EU’s external policy is frequently guided by notions of 
the “right thing to do” (Manners 2002; Toje 2008). Included here are the defence or 
promotion of human rights and democratic principles in extra-territorial spaces – 
activities consistent with the Union’s post-modern vision of sovereignty and its assumed 
status as a “civilian” or “normative” power. Conversely, a combination of norms of 
exceptionalism, a Westphalian conception of sovereign autonomy, and “hard power” 
means that US foreign policy has tended to be more unilateralist, strategically 
instrumental and self-serving (Kagan 2004; Smith 2004). 
Although useful, such binary contrasts between the EU and the US run the risk of 
producing exaggerated caricatures, and failing to capture important aspects of countries’ 
foreign policy identity, interests and behaviour. The US may well be characterised by 
unilateral exceptionalism, but the country is also unique in the degree to which 
democratic ideals enter foreign policy discourse, a trait that Moss (1995) ascribes to 
America’s historic foundation upon liberal ideals. Correspondingly, the US has assumed 
a lead role in spreading democracy worldwide, a moral cause frequently invoked by 
policy-makers as constitutive of the national interest (Barkan 2004; Chandler 2003; 
Sparke 2007). 
We can also identify variations amongst European states. For Hyde-Price (2000, 
p.39), “German identity has been reconstructed in opposition to the excessive nationalism 
of the past and the militarisation of German patriotism that it involved.” Accordingly, 
domestic interests have been defined around Western values, with human rights and 
democracy occupying a prominent position in foreign policy discourse (Erb 2003, p.221). 
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The British and French, partly as a function of their history as colonial powers, have 
sought to maintain a more independent, geostrategically-oriented foreign policy. For sure, 
both countries have incorporated notions of human rights protection (and, to a lesser 
extent, democratic freedoms) into their conceptions of the national interest, and have 
been frontrunners in promoting human rights internationally (Wong 2006). Yet the 
general opinion is that commercial and geostrategic imperatives have continued to 
command significant influence over foreign policy decisions and have frequently 
trumped moral considerations (Carmona 1998; Chandler 2003; Power 2000). 
 
Previous Work 
 
Notwithstanding the possibility that states may behave differently, we nevertheless 
remain sceptical towards Western powers’ ethical turn, and their willingness to 
implement self-declared commitments by restricting the sale of arms to countries that 
violate human rights and democratic norms. Previous work mostly endorses our 
scepticism. A number of case-studies have therefore documented the transfer of weapons 
from Western states to countries with dubious human rights and democratic practices – 
for example, the British export of Hawk jets to Indonesia (Amnesty International 2006; 
Cooper 2006; Gaskarth 2006). Other studies have made use of descriptive statistics to 
demonstrate more systematic patterns of neglect of ethical principles. Berrigan et al 
(2005), for instance, reports that 13 of the top 25 recipients of US arms transfers in 2003 
were defined as “undemocratic” by the country’s State Department. Similarly, Yanik 
(2006) reports that over the period 1999-2003, France, Germany, the UK and the US 
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respectively exported weapons to 12, 5, 9 and 32 countries defined as “undemocratic” or 
“partially democratic” by Freedom House4. Dunne and Freeman (2003) report that 19.1% 
of UK arms exports – by value for the year 2001 – went to “highly sensitive” countries, 
which include those with an ‘undemocratic regime with a grave and consistent pattern of 
human rights abuses’ (pg.14).    
  While the above studies paint a rather dismal account of recent practice, a more 
positive picture emerges from Blanton’s (2000, 2005) statistical work. Departing from 
previous studies, the author makes use of a two-stage decision-making econometric 
model to estimate the influence of human rights and democracy on US arms exports. The 
first focuses on the qualification decision, i.e. whether a country is eligible to receive 
arms, and for the sub-set of countries that qualify, the second stage examines the 
allocation decision, i.e. the volume of arms to transfer. For samples covering the post-
Cold War period, Blanton finds that human rights abusing countries are less likely to 
qualify (stage one) for US transfers, while more democratic countries also have a greater 
propensity to receive arms. She also finds that democracies exhibit a greater probability 
of receiving a larger amount of arms, although human rights do not seem to matter in this 
second stage. 
Yet does this mean that other contributions to the literature have generated a 
misleading impression of Western countries’ arms transfer practices? Any answer to this 
question, of course, is complicated by the fact that different studies use very different 
evaluative criteria. Focusing on a small number of high-profile examples, many case-
                                                 
4
 Freedom House is a US non-profit organization which compiles data on the state of freedom and 
democracy in countries around the world, see: www.freedomhouse.org. 
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study contributions have adopted a largely absolutist conception: the export of weapons 
to any country with dubious human rights or democratic credentials is taken as evidence 
that countries have ignored their ethical commitments. Studies based on an analysis of 
descriptive statistics, meanwhile, have interpreted neglect on the basis that Western states 
have exported weapons to a significant number of countries in violation of self-declared 
ethical principles. Blanton relaxes these criteria. For her, the issue is not whether 
countries export weapons to human right abusing or autocratic regimes, but whether they 
are less likely to export weapons or export a lower share their of overall weapons to these 
countries. 
We are sympathetic to Blanton’s approach, not least because it acknowledges that 
ethical behaviour may be just as much evidenced by what countries do (i.e. discriminate 
against certain countries in sanctioning weapons exports), as what they do not. We are 
also sympathetic to Blanton’s large-sample, econometric approach. It allows the 
influence of human rights and democracy to be isolated, namely, by controlling for other 
determinants which might plausibly shape the destination of arms transfers. Amongst the 
latter are various interest-related factors which provide useful clues as to underlying 
motivations. An econometric approach also allows a large number of recipient countries 
and years to be examined, and therefore to determine whether arms transfer patterns hold 
across multiple cases. 
Accepting a less restrictive conception of ethically-motivated behaviour, the real 
question becomes whether Blanton’s findings are exceptional. It could well be that her 
results are simply the result of country selection, data source or statistical specification. 
Our goal in the present paper is therefore to undertake a new econometric analysis of 
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arms transfers. Our approach differs from Blanton’s in a number of important ways. First, 
and perhaps most fundamentally, we examine a larger sample of arms exporting 
countries. As well as the US, we examine transfers from France, Germany and the UK. 
Our reason for selecting these four countries is that they not only accounted for roughly 
60% of total arms transfers to developing countries between 1992-2004, but also for the 
vast bulk of the West’s arms transfers to the Third World during this period. 
 Second, we use a different dependent variable, which has both advantages and 
disadvantages compared to Blanton’s.5 The major advantage of our dependent variable is 
that it is based on a volume measure of cross-border arms transfers (i.e. the amount of 
physical equipment transferred multiplied by trend indicator dollar values). Conversely, 
Blanton uses a dependent variable that captures the dollar value of arms agreements (i.e. 
licensed memorandums of sale between arms sellers and arms purchasers). Compared to 
our measure, the US Department of Defence’s foreign military sales (FMS) measure used 
by Blanton potentially underestimates true levels of cross-border arms flows, owing to 
the fact that national governments sometimes provide arms to recipients free of charge or 
sell them at a heavily discounted price. On the downside, while Blanton’s dependent 
variable records both small and large weapons, the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) data used for our dependent variable only captures the latter. 
Even if we were to use the FMS data for the US, a basic lack of comparable bilateral data 
on small arms transfers in the case of Germany, France and the UK means that we could 
not make like-for-like comparison between the four countries. 
                                                 
5
 We do not wish to enter a prolonged debate here on the relative merits of these measures, 
although we return to discrepancies between the two in discussing our results later in the paper.  
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Method 
 
The Estimation Model 
 
Similar to Blanton, our estimation approach distinguishes between two decision-making 
stages, qualification and allocation. This is warranted for both substantive reasons (arms 
exporters are likely to first screen out countries to whom they do not export at all before 
deciding on how much to export to those deemed eligible) and statistical reasons (a large 
share of zero values violates the assumptions according to which ordinary least squares 
produces unbiased and efficient results). At the qualification stage, a dummy variable is 
used as our dependent variable – set to one if a country receives arms from the exporting 
state under investigation, and to zero if a country receives no arms. In the allocation 
stage, the variable to be explained is the share of the exporter’s total arms transfers that a 
specific developing country receives.6 Underlying our use of share (as opposed to the 
absolute level) is the fact that we are primarily interested in whether there are systematic 
differences in the geographic pattern of an individual Western country’s arms allocation 
decisions across developing countries, rather than why certain exporters transfer more 
arms overall than others.  
A two-staged estimation strategy allows us to test whether human rights and 
democracy are used as criteria to systematically screen out certain countries from 
                                                 
6
 In order to better conform to the requirements of OLS, we take the natural log of the allocated 
arms transfer share variable.  
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receiving arms altogether, or merely as criteria for limiting the amount of arms 
transferred. The latter could arise where a government wishes to restrict exports of 
particular weapons (e.g. tanks). For estimating the first stage, we use a so-called logit 
estimator, which is standard practice where the dependent variable is a dummy variable. 
For the second stage, we apply ordinary least squares (OLS). Standard errors are 
clustered on recipient countries in both cases.7 If the error terms of the two stages were 
correlated with one other, then it would be preferable to estimate them jointly, rather than 
independently. In this case, the use of a so-called Heckman (1979) sample selection 
model, which estimates both stages jointly, would be warranted. Yet tests suggest that the 
two stages can be treated as independent. We therefore report results for the separate logit 
and OLS models below.8  
  
The Dependent Variables 
 
Data on arms transfers were provided to us directly by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI). Our sample covers the period 1992-2004. We select 1992 as 
our start date because this marks the beginning of a new wave of major ethically-
motivated arms transfer initiatives by leading Western arms exporters.  
                                                 
7
 This accounts for the fact that observations from the same potential recipient country over time 
are not independent from each other. In practical terms, clustering ensures that standard errors are 
not under-estimated. 
8
 Note, our results are fully robust to using the Heckman model. 
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 Ongoing globalization of the defence industry has greatly complicated the 
collection of arms transfer statistics. As Brauer (2007, p.975) observes, “a sale 
originating in any one state may still be credited to that state but production is as likely to 
take place in a variety of locations around the globe”. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
SIPRI’s data are based on reports of licensed transfers from particular countries, the fact 
that production is more geographically fragmented than the statistics report does not pose 
a particular problem for the purposes of the present study. 
SIPRI’s data cover major conventional arms transfers – namely, aircrafts, armored 
vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships and engines for military aircrafts, ships 
and armored vehicles – owing to the absence of reliable statistics on cross-border flows 
of small arms and light weapons. While much of the conflict literature has focused on 
small weapons, it is worth noting that conventional weapons have also been widely used 
by governments/combatants to commit human rights abuses, or for autocratic regimes to 
maintain their grip on power (Amnesty International 2006; Goldring 2006). The non-
inclusion of small weapons will mean, however, that we miss some arms exports. 
SIPRI attempts to measure the volume of major arms transfers and values these 
by trend indicators of unit production costs, rather than the actual price paid (Smith and 
Tasiran 2005). This suits us because the SIPRI measure is closer to the real value of the 
arms exports, whereas the purchase price may well reflect other factors, including 
political considerations. There is some measurement error of course in the dependent 
variable (Smith and Tasiran 2005), but since there is no reason why this measurement 
error should be systematically correlated with out explanatory variables, we see no major 
reason for concern. 
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The Explanatory Variables 
 
Arms transfers in any one year are likely to lag licensing decisions by governments, such 
that they will logically be influenced by conditions in preceding years. We therefore lag 
all of the explanatory variables by two years.9 Our explanatory variables of central 
interest are the extent to which developing countries (a) respect human rights and (b) 
have a democratic political system. For human rights, we use a measure provided by 
Gibney (2007), who employs information from US State Department and Amnesty 
International reports on human rights conditions. Gibney’s measure runs from 1 to 5, 
with 1 indicating a state of affairs in which the rule of law prevails, people are not 
imprisoned for their political views, torture is rare or exceptional and political murders 
are extraordinarily rare, and 5 representing widespread political imprisonment, torture, 
disappearances and political murders. Democracy is captured by Marshall et al’s (2006) 
widely-used polity2 indicator. The measure is derived from expert judgments on aspects 
of institutionalized democracy and autocracy within a country. Polity2 runs from -10 to 
10, with -10 representing a totally authoritarian political system, and 10 representing full 
democracy. Inevitably, with their emphasis on civil and political aspects, our measures 
adopt a largely “Western” conception of what constitutes human rights and democracy 
(Dodds 2005)10. Yet we do not believe this to be especially problematic in the present 
                                                 
9
 Our results are robust to using a one-year lag or no lag at all. 
10
 To take one example: in debates over human rights, China’s political leadership has frequently 
placed far greater store on social and economic rights than civil and political ones. 
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context where our concern is whether Western powers abide by their own standards of 
human rights and democracy. 
We run two sets of regressions: one where human rights and democracy variables 
are continuous, and another where they are dummies capturing the most autocratic 
(polity2<=-7) and human rights violating (pts>=4) countries. Although our predominant 
focus is on the former, we are nevertheless interested in whether our results hold when 
considering the “worst offenders”, countries (e.g. Saudi Arabia) which have figured 
heavily in debates about the practical implementation of countries’ ethical foreign policy 
commitments (Jenkins 2007). 
We also include additional explanatory variables that attempt to capture national 
economic and geopolitical interests of Western arms exporters. Beginning with the 
former, our model includes the value of bilateral trade as a share of the supplier’s gross 
domestic product (GDP), with data taken from Gleditsch (2002) and World Bank (2006). 
We also include a dummy variable that is set to one if a developing country is allied to 
the arms exporter (data from Leeds (2005)). If states were indeed to act in ways 
consistent with their domestic security interests, we should logically expect them to 
transfer more arms to countries with which they share a military alliance. We additionally 
include a dummy variable for former colonies in the case of European exporters. As 
documented in the literature, ex-colonizers often exhibit ongoing interests in Third World 
states that were once part of their empire, such that an instrumental, materialist foreign 
policy might increase the willingness of relevant governments to sanction arms exports 
(Power 2000; Slater and Bell 2002; Wong 2006). As an additional geopolitical, interest-
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based variable, we include the absolute distance between the capital cities of the exporter 
and developing country, using data from Bennett and Stam (2005). 
Finally, with a view to isolating the effects of supply and demand-side factors, we 
include control variables which capture the demand for arms imports. Although modeling 
arms demand is notoriously difficult, we attempt to approximate it by using three 
variables previously identified in the literature (Brauer 2007; Smith and Tasiran 2005). 
The first is a variable which measures – on a 0-3 scale – the intensity of armed conflict in 
(potential) recipient countries, be it an international conflict or, more likely, a civil war 
(data from Gleditsch et al (2002)). A country engaged in armed conflict should plausibly 
exhibit a higher demand for arms. Second, based on the observation that richer countries 
can better afford to pay for expensive weaponry than poorer ones, we use per capita GDP 
(using data from World Bank 2006) as a proxy for ability to pay. Third, we include a 
measure of the domestic military capacity of (potential) developing-country recipients, as 
well as its squared term to allow for a non-linear effect of capacity on demand for arms 
imports. This follows the common argument in the arms transfer literature that countries 
with very limited military capacity have low demand for arms imports because they have 
no use for them, whereas countries with very high military capacity have low demand for 
arms imports because they have enough capacity to produce arms domestically, such that 
it is the countries with medium military capacity that should have the highest demand. 
We employ the Correlates of War project’s Composite Index of National Capacity 
(CINC) score, which is a composite measure of military expenditures, population size 
and energy consumption.11 
                                                 
11
 Data from http://correlatesofwar.org/. 
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Results 
 
Table 1 details our statistical results for the complete sample of developing countries. For 
each sender, we report two sets of coefficients, corresponding to the selection and 
allocation stages, respectively. We begin with our main explanatory variables. At the 
selection stage, coefficients for our human rights variable are statistically insignificant in 
all cases, suggesting that human rights conditions have made no difference to whether (or 
not) developing countries have received weapons from any of the major Western arms 
supplying states. Identical results are obtained at the allocation stage for the three 
European states. However, in the case of the US, a positive and statistically significant 
coefficient suggests that human abusing states have actually received a greater share of 
the country’s arms overall transfers.  
 
<<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>> 
 
 At the selection stage, results for democracy are similar to human rights, in that 
estimated coefficients for our measure of democratic polity are statistically insignificant 
for all four exporters. Results for stage two, concerned with allocation shares, are more 
variable. As in the first stage, we find that the US has failed to discriminate amongst 
countries according to whether they are more or less democratic, at least in terms of the 
volume of weapons transferred. For France and the UK, the results are even more 
striking: a negative and statistically significant coefficient indicates that more autocratic 
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countries have actually received a greater share of French and British weapons. Yet we 
find precisely the opposite for Germany: our estimated coefficient in the second stage is 
positive and statistically significant. 
What other factors are systematically correlated with arms transfers from the four 
Western arms exporting countries? Three (largely, supply-side) attributes appear to have 
been influential, although some geographic variability is apparent. One is the presence of 
a military alliance. As indicated by positive and statistically significant coefficients, allies 
of Germany, the UK and the US are more likely to have qualified for arms transfers from 
these countries. With the exception of Germany, however, a similar positive relationship 
does not carry through to the allocation stage. Another correlate is spatial proximity. Our 
estimations suggest that the French, British and Americans have been more willing to 
supply weapons to countries which are further away. A similar relationship exists for the 
US in the second stage, but for none of the other countries, where the distance coefficient 
is statistically insignificant. A third factor is bilateral trade as a share of the exporting 
country’s GDP. In the first stage, a positive and statistically significant relationship exists 
in the case of France, the UK and the US. In the second stage, only Germany and the US 
have statistically significant coefficients, both of which are positive as expected.  
With respect to our control variables, as anticipated, we estimate a positive and 
statistically significant coefficient for GDP per capita at the qualification stage for all 
four countries. At the allocation stage, GDP per capita is only statistically significant in 
the case of the US and France, again with a positive sign. Also conforming to 
expectations, we find that military capacity is positively and statistically significantly 
correlated with arms transfers from all four countries, both at qualification and allocation 
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stages. In line with the literature, increasing military capacity first raises the likelihood of 
arms imports and then, after a threshold has been reached, decreases it.12 The same is true 
for volume: countries of medium military capacity import more arms than either 
countries of low or countries of high military capacity.  
Conflict-intensity in the recipient state is largely insignificant. The only 
exceptions are France and the US at the second stage. Previous studies have generally 
interpreted similar findings as evidence that countries have failed to live-up to their 
ethical pledges. However, in the absence of data on whether these conflicts involved the 
“legitimate” use of force, we simply note here that our results do not contradict the basic 
tenet of organized hypocrisy. 
We now turn to our secondary estimations, where the continuous version of our 
variables of main interest are replaced with dummy variables, capturing the most human 
rights violating and autocratic countries. We briefly summarize findings without 
reporting them in a regression table. Only two basic results change. First, our human 
rights coefficient for US transfers becomes positive and statistically significant at the 
qualification stage, mirroring identical findings at the allocation stage. Second, the 
coefficient for democracy becomes insignificant for Germany in the second stage 
estimation, whereas it was previously positive and statistically significant. Similarly, the 
importance of economic and geopolitical considerations hardly changes. For our military 
alliance variable at the first stage, the coefficient moves from statistical insignificance to 
                                                 
12
 Further military capacity increases will then eventually have a negative effect on arms imports, 
but the estimated coefficients and the distribution of the military capacity variable suggest that 
this is only relevant for developing countries at the very top end of military capacity. 
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become positive and statistically significant in the case of France, while for Germany, the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient is rendered statistically insignificant. All 
of the other variables of substantive interest remain basically unchanged.  
Accepting these cross-country differences, our findings nevertheless broadly 
contradict results from the only other large-sample, econometric work, which has 
investigated the links between US arms transfers and liberal democratic principles 
(Blanton 2005, 2000). Why the discrepancy? One possible answer is data. As noted 
earlier, Blanton’s dataset for US transfers features both large and small arms, whereas 
ours’ is restricted to the former. It could be that the US government has been more 
willing to enforce export restrictions in the case of small arms. Similarly, arms sales 
agreements may fail to capture important post-contract dynamics. Considerable 
discrepancies exist in the statistics between the value of arms agreements and actual 
deliveries which, if not randomly distributed across countries, would bias the estimation 
results. 
Another possible explanation is the specification of Blanton’s estimation models. 
Missing from her models is military capacity which, according to previous work, is an 
important determinant of arms transfers (Smith and Tasiran 2005). Also missing are 
variables for military alliances, trade and distance. The point here is that the omission of 
these variables – and, by implication, the under-specification of Blanton’s estimation 
models – might have contributed to her findings regarding human rights and democracy. 
Clearly, more work is needed to scrutinize the underlying reasons for these discrepancies.  
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Conclusions and discussion 
 
Ideas of new beginnings, agendas and spatial horizons have long been a feature of the 
geopolitical imagination (Agnew and Corbridge 1995). Since the early-1990s, one such 
imaginary (re-)scripted by Western political elites is that they have moved away from the 
state-centric agenda of the Cold War era, dominated by purely self-interested concerns 
for domestic economy, security and power. According to the rhetoric, a more ethically-
grounded foreign policy has taken its place, underpinned by universal moral principles 
and a commitment to promote the protection of rights and freedoms of extra-territorial 
citizens. Critical geographers have been quick to criticize these and similar socio-spatial 
imaginaries. Amongst others, they have argued that such scripts have often performed 
covert, instrumental roles. That is, rather than marking a more progressive moral turn in 
foreign policy action, they are part-and-parcel of a discursive strategy which seeks to 
legitimize existing security agendas, economic interests and patterns of domination over 
space (Flint and Falah 2004; O'Loughlin and Kolossov 2002; Ó Tuathail 2000; Power 
2003; Roberts et al 2003; Sparke 2007).  
In the present paper, we set-out to scrutinize the alleged gap between political 
imaginaries and material outcomes, using the example of Western arms exports to 
developing countries. Our basic thesis is that states’ official commitment to a value-based 
arms controls policy is largely a matter of symbolic politics – with countries reluctant to 
sacrifice national interests of economy and security in name of protecting or advancing 
the rights and freedoms of extra-territorial citizens. Using quantitative data on large 
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weapons transfers from France, Germany, the UK and the US over the period 1992-2004, 
we find evidence to support our arguments. 
According to our statistical estimations, neither human rights abuses nor 
autocratic polity would appear to reduce the likelihood of countries receiving Western 
arms, or reduce the relative share of a particular exporter’s weapons they receive. In fact, 
human rights abusing countries are actually more likely to receive weapons from the US, 
while autocratic regimes emerge as more likely recipients of weaponry from France and 
the UK. Reinforcing the impression that extra-territorial ethical considerations are far 
from paramount, we show that the geography of Western arms exports is closely aligned 
with self-interested, economically and geopolitically-important relational ties. Hence 
developing countries which are more important trading partners exhibit a greater 
probability of qualifying for arms, as generally do countries which fulfill the domestic 
interests of the supplying state extra-territorially as military allies. Western countries 
have not, it seems, systematically acted counter to more conventional, materialist 
interests. 
Our statistical estimations say nothing about underlying causality, but it would be 
difficult to square the above findings with behavioral explanations based solely on 
hegemony. If power were indeed the decisive variable, then the US should logically be 
expected to have shown a greater propensity to defy international normative roles than 
the three European states, both in the case of human rights and democracy. For sure, the 
US hardly acts in the spirit of its self-declared ethical principles, but nor does France or 
the UK. Both sets of countries have systematically contravened one principle or another. 
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Germany fares only slightly better with respect to democracy, but not human rights 
protection. 
What seems to matter more, at least in defining what states can or cannot get 
away with, are domestic institutions (Donnelly and Liang-Fenton 2004). That the US is 
more willing to overtly ignore human rights abuses than autocratic government is broadly 
consistent with the idea that the country is, first and foremost, founded on democratic 
ideals rather than humanitarian ones (Moss 1995). Although far from irrelevant, the 
domestic appropriateness of defending or promoting democracy in non-domestic spaces 
would appear to be less deeply institutionalized in Britain and France than in the US. 
Instead, partly as a consequence of their historic role in colonialism, norms of extra-
territorial responsibility are centrally defined around human rights.13 The idea that 
domestic institutions matter is also supported by the German case – the country with the 
“least bad” record regarding arms transfers. Germany’s foreign policy identity, which 
was formed in the shadow of an excessively autocratic, militaristic and human rights 
violating past, is one where economic or geostrategic concerns are least likely to trump 
the promotion of Western values (Erb 2003). 
What are the implications of our findings? Most obviously, by exposing the 
hypocrisy underlying geopolitical imaginaries of ethical foreign policy, they remind us of 
the importance of interrogating the discursive constructions of political leaders (Flint and 
Falah 2004; Ó Tuathail 1992; Roberts et al 2003). While a more ethically-grounded 
foreign policy may script a geopolitics of hope (Sparke 2007), underpinned by a 
                                                 
13
 As noted earlier, human rights have formed the centre-piece of each country’s ethical foreign 
policy commitments, as well as the EU’s Code of Conduct. 
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deterritorialised concern for the well-being of a more spatially inclusive, cosmopolitan 
humanity, our findings suggest that such socio-spatial narratives (potentially) conceal a 
geopolitics of territorial egoism. In an important sense, therefore, our study speaks to 
wider debates about the changing boundaries of the modern state. Although it has become 
popular to talk about a blurring of domestic and foreign, and the emergence of a post-
sovereign state identity, the findings of the present study suggest that it is important not 
to take this argument too far. Aspirationally and rhetorically, Western countries may 
subscribe to a non-territorial conception of rights and duties, and envision a state whose 
interests lie in promoting universal values across borders. Yet if the case of arms control 
is anything to go by, these universals have not generally dislodged the primacy of 
national economic and geopolitical interests. Far from the borderless world envisaged by 
hyperglobalists, territorial borders would appear to continue to enframe economic and 
geostrategic interests, and centrally guide Western states’ foreign policy actions (Yeung 
1998). 
We do wish to caveat these remarks. Our statistical estimations capture general 
propensities, such that results suggesting that individual Western powers are no less 
likely to export arms to human rights abusing or autocratic countries cannot be taken as 
evidence that these countries’ leaders have never embargoed arms sales on ethical 
grounds. Our results also say nothing about the behavior of other major arms exporters – 
including non-Western ones (e.g. China and Russia). Still, the study’s findings 
nevertheless paints a rather gloomy portrayal of Western countries’ post-Cold War value-
driven foreign policy and serves as a reminder of some of the systemic contradictions 
opened by globalization (Ó Tuathail 2000; Toje 2008). For now, at least, these 
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contradictions would appear to have been frequently resolved through organizational 
hypocrisy in the case of arms. An important question is whether, looking into the future, 
promoting the rights and freedoms of distant strangers will become more deeply 
institutionalized among domestic actors to the extent that acting “ethically” towards 
extra-territorial others truly becomes a consequential national interest similar to more 
traditional economic and security concerns. 
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Table 1. Estimation results. 
 France Germany UK US 
 
First stage: Selection 
Human rights violations (importer) 0.179 0.083 -0.094 0.220 
 (1.04) (0.38) (0.45) (1.28) 
Democracy (importer) -0.039 -0.038 -0.039 -0.017 
 (1.50) (1.32) (1.24) (0.63) 
Bilateral trade (% of GDP of exporter) 5.37 -1.83 3.05 6.77 
 (2.43)** (1.26) (2.14)** (1.89)* 
Importer is allied 0.792 2.207 2.616 1.220 
 (1.14) (1.63)* (2.27)** (2.67)*** 
Importer is former colony 0.003  0.387  
 (0.01)  (0.95)  
ln Distance 0.972 0.417 1.192 1.134 
 (2.45)** (1.08) (2.02)** (2.25)** 
Armed conflict in importer -0.083 0.180 0.105 0.014 
 (0.60) (0.98) (0.70) (0.12) 
ln GDP p.c. (importer) 0.661 1.040 0.417 0.867 
 (3.47)*** (5.34)*** (2.50)** (6.18)*** 
Military capacity (importer) 0.960 1.349 0.727 1.163 
 (1.82)* (3.11)*** (2.53)** (2.53)** 
Military capacity squared -6.280 -5.958 -4.763 -1.341 
 (1.58) (1.67)* (2.19)** (2.97)*** 
 
Second stage: Allocation 
Human rights violations (importer) -0.215 0.089 0.382 0.245 
 (1.46) (0.49) (1.41) (1.73)* 
Democracy (importer) -0.064 0.057 -0.044 -0.055 
 (2.32)** (1.86)* (1.69)* (1.50) 
Bilateral trade (% of GDP of exporter) -0.474 2.007 0.194 2.99 
 (0.40) (2.12)** (0.15) (2.82)*** 
Importer is allied 1.151 1.741 0.319 0.453 
 (1.50) (2.16)** (0.63) (1.05) 
Importer is former colony 0.179  0.595  
 (0.21)  (1.34)  
ln Distance 0.155 0.418 0.154 0.848 
 (0.60) (1.42) (0.45) (1.97)* 
Armed conflict in importer 0.283 -0.104 -0.089 0.250 
 (1.74)* (0.57) (0.53) (1.85)* 
ln GDP p.c. (importer) 0.507 0.073 0.259 0.602 
 (2.16)** (0.43) (1.16) (3.84)*** 
Military capacity (importer) 0.791 0.300 0.571 0.397 
 (5.05)*** (1.53) (3.07)*** (1.20) 
Military capacity squared -4.583 -3.186 -4.580 -5.570 
 (4.66)*** (2.02)** (3.27)*** (1.96)* 
(Pseudo) R-squared (first/second stage) 0.34/0.33 0.34/0.31 0.27/0.19 0.35/0.37 
Observations (first/second stage) 1449/209 1388/190 1449/155 1436/358 
Notes: s.e. clustered on dyad. Absolute z-statistics in parentheses. Constant included in both stages, but not 
reported.   *** statistically significant at p < .01 ** p < .05, * p < .1 
